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THE ONLINE ADVERTISING TAX:  
A DIGITAL POLICY INNOVATION 
L Key Messages
Google and Facebook now control about two thirds of 
global advertising revenue. They dominate the online 
advertising market in the form of a duopoly and avoid 
paying adequate taxes. This policy brief introduces a new 
possibility and policy innovation for taxing online adver-
tising.
 > This brief sheds new light on the question how to estab-
lish models for taxing online advertising and digital cor-
porations. Drawing on Christian Fuchs’ theory of digital 
labour, it stresses that only human labour creates value 
and that on digital media the boundary between value-
production and commodity consumption has become 
blurred.
 > Policy measures for taxing transnational corporations, 
including digital companies, need to be based not just 
on the question where and how much value is produced, 
but also on the question who produces how much value.
 > The legal definition of the ‘digital permanent estab-
lishment’ that is used in the context of taxing online 
companies should be built on the insight that only 
human labour creates commodities’ economic value. 
Therefore, one should accordingly discern among dif-
ferent forms of digital value generation and how to tax 
them.
 > Legislating taxation of the digital economy is based on 
specific models of digital value-creation such as the digi-
tal content as commodity model, the online advertising 
model, the online retail model, the sharing economy-
pay per service model, sharing economy-rent on rent 
model, the digital subscription model, or mixed models.
 > In order to counter the dominance of for-profit mono-
poly platforms on the Internet, the creation of a public 
service Internet is a viable policy option.
 > Introducing an online advertising tax is an ideal financial 
foundation for supporting the creation of public service 
Internet platforms and civil society Internet  platforms/
platform co-operatives.
b WHAT’S THE ISSUE?
In the age of austerity, there has been increased public criticism 
of large transnational corporations’ low tax contributions. Google 
and Facebook dominate the online advertising market in the form 
of a duopoly and avoid paying adequate taxes while  complying 
with the taxation system in place. This policy brief introduces a 
new possibility and policy innovation for taxing online  advertising. 
Google and Facebook are among the world’s largest transnational 
corporations. In the 2017 Forbes ranking of the 2,000 biggest 
global companies, Google/Alphabet came 24th with an annual 
profit of US$19.5 billion.1 With a profit of US$9.5 billion, Face-
book was in 119th place.2 Neither company sells communication 
services. They are the world’s two largest advertising corporations.
‘Google and Facebook now control about
two thirds of global advertising revenue’
There is an overall shift of advertising revenue from print towards 
digital. In this context, Google and Facebook now control about 
two thirds of global advertising revenue.
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Google is estimated to have controlled 55.2% of global advertising 
revenue in 2016, and Facebook 12.3%.3 Given their tax avoidance 
strategies, their online advertising duopoly and their economic 
importance, such companies contribute to the trend that trans-
national corporations hardly pay taxes. This trend has been recog-
nised as a severe problem, but no solution has yet been found. The 
question is how to properly tax digital and online corporations.
M RESEARCH EVIDENCE
Christian Fuchs’ critical theory of digital media provides a frame-
work for the analysis of online companies’ political economy, 
including a theory of digital labour and a digital labour theory 
of value (Fuchs 2008, 2015, 2017a). Insights from this theory 
shed new light on the question how to establish models for taxing 
online advertising and digital corporations.
How is Value Created in Digital Corporations such 
as Google and Facebook?
The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons (UK), 
under the leadership of Margaret Hodge, inquired into trans-
national corporations’ tax avoidance, with a focus on Google, 
Amazon and Starbucks. The select committee twice interviewed 
Alphabet/Google’s Matt Brittin, who is now the company’s 
 President of Business and Operations for Europe, the Middle East 
and Africa. Brittin argued in a manner that is typical for digital 
corporations that avoid paying taxes. The main elements of this 
logic of arguments are the following ones:
1. Computer technology creates value: Google’s value 
derives from its algorithm, technology and software.
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2. Google’s value is created in California: This software 
is developed by engineers in California. Accordingly, 
the creation of Google’s economic value takes place in 
California.
3. Google should pay taxes in California: Taxes should 
be paid where value is created. In Google’s case, that is 
California.
4. Online advertising is placeless and thus eludes 
national tax legislation: Google’s advertising trade 
takes place in the placeless Internet, not in a particular 
country. Advertising sales do not take place in a specific 
country, but via an auction algorithm that is operated 
by algorithms whose physical location is not clearly 
defined. Google’s European invoices are drawn up in 
Ireland and there is a trade between Google in Ireland 
and the European advertising clients.
The digital labour theory of value challenges these claims:
1. Only human beings communicate productively and 
produce communicatively, creating the practical and 
economic value of the Internet: Only humans can cre-
ate economic value, technology cannot. If there were 
only machines and no human beings, no goods could be 
produced, distributed and consumed. Fully automated 
production without human beings would break down 
as soon as machines stalled and could not be repaired. 
Unlike human beings, machines have no morals, no 
creativity and are unable to anticipate the future state of 
society, and are thus only capable of limited action.
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2. Google and Facebook’s users create the value with 
which these companies operate and which they sell as 
Big Data: Google’s software platforms are not commodi-
ties. We do not pay to use Google’s search engine. Google 
does not sell its search service to users. If something is 
not a commodity and is not sold, then it does not have  
value. For this reason, the argument that Google’s 
 Californian software engineers create the company’s 
entire value is not convincing. Google sells advertis-
ing space on the Internet using algorithmic auctions. 
The theory of the audience commodity states that in 
advertising in general, the audience’s attention is sold 
to advertisers as a commodity; in the case of data com-
modities, the users’ personal data are sold to enable 
personalised advertising (Fuchs 2017a). Without the 
users’ online activity, which is precisely monitored and 
from which the Internet corporations collect, store and 
analyse data and metadata, personalised advertising on 
Google and Facebook would not be possible. The users 
themselves create data commodities and attention to 
advertising. The theory of digital labour assumes that 
Google and Facebook’s users thus create a significant 
part of the value of these platforms, and that this value 
is not produced by the software engineers alone (Fuchs 
2017a): the software engineers only create the technolo-
gies that users employ as infrastructure that enables 
them to produce user-generated content, communicate 
with one another and gather information online, which 
is how social media actually become ‘social’ and how the 
Internet becomes alive, informative and communicative 
in the first place.
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‘Google and Facebook’s users thus create a 
significant part of the value of these platforms’
3. Without users’ activity, there would thus be no com-
munication and no social network – and no profit gen-
erated by personalised advertising, either. Google and 
Facebook’s users create economic value that is expressed 
in these companies’ profits.
4. Google and Facebook should pay for sold online 
advertisements in the country where these advertise-
ments were personalised: If Google and Facebook’s 
value creation takes place where the users are and  create 
the value of online advertising, then taxes need to be 
paid in the country where the users are when they look 
at the advertisements (in the case of cost-per-view 
advertising) or click upon it (in the case of cost-per-
click advertising).
5. Online advertising is personalised according to 
countries and locations and is therefore not place-
less: While the auction algorithms used by Google 
and  Facebook operate on the Internet, at each specific 
point in time that a user accesses Google or Facebook, 
he or she is in a specific country that has specific tax 
legislation. The user gives his or her attention to the 
advertising on Google or Facebook from this coun-
try, sometimes clicking on the advert, which leads to 
the sale of the advertisement. Both Google and Face-
book personalise advertising according to place, that 
is, for every placement of personalised advertising a 
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user sees, that user’s location is identified and stored. 
In purely technological terms, it is possible to ascertain 
which percentage of seen and clicked-upon adverts 
occurred in which country. As attention, online activ-
ity and clicks create value for Google and  Facebook – 
therefore, taxation should be based upon the share 
of  Google and Facebook advertising clicks in the 
respective countries.
In this context, it is worth highlighting how the basic economic 
transaction underlying online advertising works. If you look at a 
personalised online advert and click on it, you are redirected to 
a certain webpage belonging to the advertising client. The adver-
tising client hopes that you will purchase a certain product on 
their website or carry out a certain action. And they will pay a 
certain amount to the online advertising company (e.g. Google, 
Facebook, etc.) as the advertisement was seen or clicked upon. 
Accordingly, the sale of the advertisement as a commodity takes 
place when it is viewed or clicked upon. The advertising client pays 
for users’ personalised attention, which is only possible thanks to 
the collection and analysis of personal data. What is sold is thus 
users’ attention to advertising. The user’s online behaviour gen-
erates the data and metadata needed to enable and personalise 
online advertising.
‘What is sold is thus users’ attention to 
advertising.’
The activity of giving attention to an online advert or clicking on 
it finally leads to the monetary transaction between the advertis-
ing supplier and the advertising client. If the suppliers of online 
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advertising had only their software and algorithms but no con-
tent, data and metadata generated by the users, they would not 
be able to sell online advertising. Accordingly, the users’ online 
activity creates the value of online advertising.
How Can Digital Corporations be  
Taxed Based on Location?
The theory of digital labour allows the establishment of a new 
method for determining where companies selling online adverts 
have to pay how much taxes.
Any levy on online advertising introduced in law will be difficult 
to collect if the law’s wording states that the tax must be paid in 
the country of the advertising company’s main office. The exam-
ples of Google and Facebook show that transnational companies 
operate in many countries at the same time, which means tax 
jurisdiction is not clearly defined. By contrast, if we argue that 
the users to whom personalised advertisements are presented 
(cost-per-view) or who click on such an ad (cost-per-click) cre-
ate the value of the online advertisement and that online adver-
tising should be taxed in the country where the users at whom it 
is targeted are, the territorial allocation becomes much easier. In 
this model, the assumption is that specific national tax legislation 
applies if for example you, as a user, are in this country and click 
on an online advertisement. If you happen to be in Germany, 
then German tax law applies. In order to make online advertising 
feasible in terms of taxation, the location not of the online corpo-
ration, but of the user is key; it is the location where the service 
is performed, data and content are created, and where taxation 
should take place.
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Profit is usually taxed in the location where a commodity’s value 
is produced, whereas value-added tax regulations usually focus 
on the target country where the commodity is sold. The Internet’s 
global nature renders the application of traditional tax legislation 
difficult, as an Internet company is able to sell digital commodities 
in countries where it has no physical or legal presence. In the case of 
Facebook and Google, we have three actors: the Internet platform, 
the users and the advertisers. These three actors may be located in 
three different countries. In the case of online advertising, the con-
sumers of the platform services are also the producers of content, 
data, metadata and the attention that make online advertising 
 possible in the first place. Accordingly, they are prosumers – 
 producing consumers. Where prosumption platforms (including 
Google and Facebook) are concerned, the users’ important role in 
profit generation and value creation could be taken into account 
by taxing online profits and online advertising in the country 
where the user clicking upon or looking at an advertisement is 
located. The location of users who click on and view adverts can 
be determined via IP addresses. When visiting an Internet plat-
form, it is standard procedure for the IP address to be retrieved 
and usually stored for each access. This enables advertising to be 
personalised according to countries and places.
This model could be implemented in such a way that in the UK 
(or in other countries), companies such as Google or  Facebook 
would be required to statistically analyse what proportion of 
 payment-generating advertising clicks or impressions were 
 executed in Britain (or in whichever country is charging the 
online advertising tax). The corresponding national share of the 
global profit, global value creation and global turnover per year 
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could then be used as the financial basis for calculating the pay-
able annual online advertising tax. Another option would be to 
calculate profit, value creation and turnover according to the 
country’s share of global active users as the financial basis for taxa-
tion; however, this would produce only a rough estimate.
Y REVIEW OF POLICY OPTIONS
The Diverted Profits Tax
In the UK, the ‘diverted profits tax’ that is also called the ‘Google 
Tax’ was introduced in 2015. The basic idea behind the diverted 
profits tax is that profits generated in the UK and diverted to other 
countries are taxed at 25%, which is higher than regular corpora-
tion tax. The underlying idea is that this measure makes tax avoid-
ance less attractive.
‘the “Google tax” has no legal mechanism for 
defining and determining the share of value 
produced in a specific national jurisdiction’
One decisive point of criticism made in this report is that it is 
however still legal for transnational corporations not to book the 
turnover generated in a particular country in that country, but 
instead to allocate parts of their overall turnover to various inter-
national subsidiaries as they see fit. Thus, a decisive problem is 
that the ‘Google tax’ has no legal mechanism for defining and 
determining the share of value produced in a specific national 
jurisdiction. Even after the introduction of the diverted profits 
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tax, transnational corporations continue to shift their turnover 
between their international subsidiaries.
Corporate Self-Regulation and Voluntary 
 Corporate Social Responsibility
Another suggested solution is corporate self-regulation and vol-
untary corporate social responsibility under the condition of 
moral pressure, lobbying and social pressure. In late 2017, Face-
book announced that it would stop routing advertising through 
Ireland in European countries where it has a local branch. But this 
suggestion has three flaws:
 > It is a voluntary measure by Facebook that is not based 
on legislation and clear policy rules that determine 
where Facebook has to pay taxes for what activities and 
to which amount.
 > Facebook does not have branches in all countries of the 
world, which means that it will continue to avoid paying 
taxes. In 2018, Facebook’s European offices were located 
in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK. According to the United Nation’s classifica-
tion, there are 44 countries in Europe, which means that 
following its own rules, Facebook would continue not to 
pay taxes in 36 European countries.
 > There is still no policy rule that determines which 
amount of value shall be taxed in what country.
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Defining a ‘Digital Permanent Establishment’
The European Parliament, the European Commission and the 
OECD/G20 (as part of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
[BEPS]-Project) have looked into defining a digital permanent 
establishment in order to be able to tax online corporations that 
do create value in a country, where they do not have a physical 
presence (European Commission 2017, OECD 2015). In a draft 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base from 
2016, the EU suggests a formula for calculating the tax base of a 
corporation’s specific national establishment that uses a compos-
ite share of sales, salaries, employees and capital assets (European 
Commission 2016). The formula is not suited for the taxation of 
corporations whose business models are based on unpaid labour 
(such as the unpaid digital labour in the case of Facebook and 
Google). 
In 2018, an EU draft report with plans to introduce an EU Direc-
tive on Digital Permanent Establishments was published.4 It argues 
for introducing a digital services tax of 3% on the gross revenue 
of digital permanent establishments and acknowledges that ‘in 
the digital economy, a significant part of the value of a business is 
created where the users are based and data is collected and pro-
cessed’. One has to wait and see if the EU will indeed introduce a 
directive that taxes online revenues of large digital corporations. If 
this will be the case, then the question arises how exactly the value 
added by users can be defined, what different type of online busi-
ness model and therefore of digital value generation must be dis-
cerned, and how such value generation can precisely be measured.
O POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1 – Tax Models Based on a Humanist Labour Theory of Value
Found policy measures for taxing transnational corporations, 
including digital companies, not just on the question where and 
how much value is produced, but also on the question who pro-
duces value. Concepts of value, in which it is assumed that tech-
nologies (including software and algorithms) or capital produce 
value, should be avoided and preference given to models in which 
human labour is the source of economic value.
2 – Establish a Model for Taxing Online Advertisements
Create legislation according to the model introduced in this 
brief that taxes online advertising based on the assumption that 
users create the value of an online advertisement when they 
click on it (pay-per-click-model) or when they view adverts 
(pay-per-view-model).
3 – Create and Fund Public Service Internet Platforms
In order to counter the dominance of for-profit monopoly plat-
forms on the Internet, legislation that enables public service media 
to offer advertising-free online platforms so that a public service 
Internet can be created is needed (Fuchs 2017b; 2018, chapter 7). 
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It is recommended that income from a tax on online advertising 
is used to fund public service Internet platforms.
4 – Stronger Enforcement Mechanisms for Financial Authorities
Financial authorities with limited resources and lobbying by 
accounting firms can impact negatively upon the effective taxa-
tion of corporations. Introducing an online advertising tax should 
thus go hand in hand with strengthening the resources of the 
financial authorities so that these are able to effectively deal with 
the increase in monitoring and administration required. Fur-
thermore, it should be ensured that financial authorities work 
independently of lobbying organisations and that legal sanctions 
become applicable and are indeed applied when a corporation 
refuses to pay taxes or cooperate with the gathering of the tax data 
required.
Sanctions to be applied if online advertising platforms refuse to 
cooperate, falsify data, avoid taxation or commit tax fraud would 
also be important. The EU General Data Protection Regulation 
already contains a model for this: Article 83(4) and (5) offers the 
option of applying administrative fines of 2% or 4% of the com-
pany in question’s ‘total worldwide annual turnover of the preced-
ing financial year’, depending on the kind of infringement. This or 
a similar model could also be used in an online advertising tax law.
5 – Base the Definition of the ‘Digital Permanent  Establishment’ 
on a Humanist Labour Theory of Value
The legal definition of the ‘digital permanent establishment’ that 
is used in the context of taxing online companies is built on the 
insight that only human labour creates commodities’ economic 
value and accordingly discerns different forms of digital value 
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generation. In order to determine standards for taxation, one 
should always ask: What is the commodity involved? What is the 
labour that creates the commodity’s value? In which jurisdiction 
is that labour located at the point of value-production?
6 – Use Models of Digital Value Creation for the Legal Defini-
tion of Digital Permanent Establishments
If we assume that it is human labour that creates value, then this 
assumption has specific implications for different international 
digital business models. Legislating taxation of the digital economy 
is based on specific models of digital value-creation such as the 
following ones (see Fuchs 2017a, chapters 5–10; 2008, chapter 7):
 > The digital content as commodity-model: In cases where 
digital content (such as software) is sold as a commodity, 
it is decisive how many employees are located in which 
country and what share of the international corpora-
tion’s labour-time and salaries they account for. Micro-
soft is an example of this model.
 > The online advertising model: In such models, targeted 
advertising is sold as a commodity. Digital platforms act 
as constant capital. Users produce data that is valorised 
in the form of personalised adverts. For each advert that 
is shown on a profile and the gets clicked upon, one can 
determine in which country the value-generating view 
or click took place. Examples of this model include 
Google and Facebook.
 > The online retail model: Online retailers such as Ama-
zon buy commodities that they sell online. They first buy 
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goods that they then sell to others. These commodities 
are fixed capital, to which the retail workers engaged in 
the sales, packaging and transport process add value 
that constitutes the total commodity value. The service 
of retailing is the real commodity in this case. For deter-
mining value shares it is therefore decisive where the 
sales, packaging and transport process takes place.
 > The sharing economy-pay per service model: In this 
digital economy model, a platform mediates a service 
between a producer and a buyer and charges a rent on the 
service. The producer of the service generates its value, 
on which the platform owner charges a service fee/rent. 
The service creator (e.g. the Uber driver, the freelancer 
creating a digital product mediated via a platform such 
as Upwork, the babysitter advertising his or her services 
via an online platform) is located in a particular country 
so that this service’s value can be nationally allocated.
 > The sharing economy-rent on rent model: In such mod-
els, no new good is produced, but an already existing 
good is rented out via a platform that charges a rent on 
the transaction. A rent on rent is created. The most well-
known example is Airbnb. If this rent is to be taxed, then 
the decisive aspect is where the renting process takes 
place. Each flat or house rented out is located in a par-
ticular country.
 > The digital subscription model: In the case digital sub-
scription services such as Netflix, Spotify, Amazon 
Prime, or online newspapers – not a physical asset is 
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rented out, but access to a collection of digital resources. 
Other than in the case of real estate, where a rent is paid 
for the use of a property over a specific time period, in 
the case of reproducible cultural products, royalties are 
paid that depend on the number of uses (e.g. number of 
plays or downloads of a song or film) or the size of the 
good (e.g. number of pages of articles or books). In both 
cases, it is decisive, in which countries the cultural pro-
ducers (musicians, actors, writers, performers, etc.) are 
located. Take as an example the online music companies 
Bandcamp or Spotify: On Bandcamp, artists and fans 
sign up. Artists offer their music for sale that is bought 
by fans. Each artist offering music for sale is tax-resident 
in a specific country, which means that for each transac-
tion the location of value-generation can be determined. 
On Spotify, users pay a specific monthly subscription fee 
for access to a vast collection of music albums that can 
be streamed. Spotify pays royalties to rights-holders who 
are located in specific countries. In order to determine 
the tax base in one country, for each subscription fee 
paid by a user, it must be determined how many songs 
that user has listened to over a year and what share of 
rights-holders/producers is located in which country. 
Doing so allows generating a tax base for each country.
 > Mixed models: There are also mixed models that require 
taxation based on a combination of models (so for 
example, Spotify combines an advertising model and a 
subscription model).
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7 – Use the Revenue Generated by an Online Advertising Tax 
for Financially Supporting Alternative, Non-Profit Internet 
Platforms
An alternative Internet can be advanced in two ways: by public 
service media (PSM) organisations and via civil society. Public 
service Internet platforms operated by PSM can be funded out 
of an online advertising tax. Example ideas for such platforms 
include the live debate format Club 2.0 and a public service plat-
form which is fulfilling functions similar to YouTube.
Additionally, a participatory media fee which is a kind of citizen 
income that is funded through taxing corporations (and/or adver-
tising) could be introduced. The state taxes corporations and then 
distributes the resulting income through this means of participa-
tory budgeting to all citizens, who are enabled to donate and sup-
port civil society media and cultural organisations through this 
public sphere cheque.
As a result, civil society media and civil society Internet platforms 
(also called platform co-operatives) could thrive. The public ser-
vice Internet and the civil society Internet are complementary and 
should not seen as an either/or option and as competing with each 
other – both constitute important alternatives to the corporate 
Internet.
Figure 1 shows an example of the presented online advertising tax 
model.
The model visually represented in Figure 1 presents an online 
advertising tax with a hypothetical 20% tax rate on advertising 
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Figure 1: Model of online advertising tax coupled with funding 
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turnover. The fictitious company Käsebier Schweiz is using Face-
book and Google to display personalised advertisements on the 
profiles of beer drinkers in the UK and Germany. The image shows 
four concrete personalisations, of which two respectively address 
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users in Germany and the UK. The British financial authority 
(HMRC) only taxes the advertisements targeting users in Britain 
and leaves all other online advertisements aside. For both adver-
tisements, an online advertising tax of 90 cents in total is payable, 
corresponding to 20% of the cost of the advertisements. This sum 
is used to finance public service Internet platforms operated by a 
department of the BBC.
D NOTES
 1 http://www.forbes.com/global2000, last accessed 9 February 
2018.
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Google and Facebook currently control close to two-thirds 
of global advertising revenue. While dominating the online 
advertising market, these two companies have thus far 
avoided paying adequate taxes.
This CAMRI policy brief presents a new policy innovation, 
the online advertising tax. Considering the key role of 
user activity and user data for the value of Google and 
Facebook’s services, it explains how digital advertising 
companies’ revenues could be taxed based on the respective 
country in which targeted users are located.
 
The author reviews existing policy arguments and policy 
options and sets out practical steps to ensure that tax 
avoidance by online advertising companies is mitigated. 
Furthermore, he illustrates how tax revenues could be used 
to support public service internet platforms.
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